MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS--LIABILITY-SECTION
1983
AUTHORIZES MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO TRAIN
EMPLOYEES

IN LIMITED

CIRCUMSTANCES,

City of Canton v.

Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
Section 1983 provides a federal civil remedy for individuals
whose constitutional rights are violated "under color of" state
law.' While states and, in some instances, individual officials are
immune to § 1983 actions, 2 the United States Supreme Court has
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) authorizes federal jurisdiction for § 1983 claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982).
Section 1983 was developed as a means of enforcing the fourteenth amendment, a power given to Congress in section 5 of that amendment. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Accordingly, the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" referred to in § 1983, include the rights protected by, or
incorporated in, the fourteenth amendment. See id. See also S. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 73-77, 124 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the interrelationship between § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment). Claims arising
under § 1983 are frequently analyzed as two separate inquiries: whether the independent requirements of § 1983 are met; and whether there is an underlying
constitutional or statutory violation. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d
639 (7th Cir. 1981). See also infra note 84 (discussing the Parratt Court two prong
inquiry).
2 Although § 1983 does not expressly provide for any government immunities,
the Court has incorporated several into the statute. See Eckhardt & Eckhardt, 42
U.S.C. § 1983: A Primerfor the Civil Rights Lawyer, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 585, 596 (1984);
Levin, The Section 1983 MunicipalImmunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1485 (1977).
Some of these official immunities are absolute, see, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators); Imbier v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators), other immunities are qualified, see, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison
officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (hospital administrators);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive branch officers). Qualified immunity protects officials insofar as they act in good faith in attempting to fulfill their responsibilities. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
States have been held to be immune from § 1983 actions by virtue of the eleventh amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also Quern v.
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determined that municipalities have no such immunity.3 The
Supreme Court has required, however, that city policymakers
play some causal role in a municipality's alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights in order for municipal liability to attach.4
While lower courts have generally agreed that the failure to
properly train police officers can constitute such a role,5 there
has been much debate over the appropriate standards for inadequate training claims under § 1983.6 In the recent decision of
City of Canton v. Harris,7 the United States Supreme Court eliminated this uncertainty by holding that a municipality may be held
liable for failure to train its police force only where the municipality has shown "deliberate indifference" to the likelihood of
the alleged deprivation."
In 1978, officers of the Canton City Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris and placed her in a patrol wagon. 9 Upon
their arrival at the police station, the officers found Mrs. Harris
sitting on the vehicle's floor."l When an officer inquired about
whether she needed medical attention, Harris responded incoJordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (affirming Edelman despite the elimination of municipal
immunity). But see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that states are not
immune from prospective relief). The Court has determined that the eleventh
amendment does not protect municipalities. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).
3 See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text. See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that municipalities are not entitled to good
faith immunity).
4 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text
5 See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 & n.6 (1989) (indicating
that all circuit courts have approved of such grounds) (citations omitted).
6 See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
must prove gross negligence by municipality); Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d
639, 650, 651 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff must prove pattern of misconduct by municipality); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980
(1979) ("single brutal incident" can permit municipal liability); Edmonds v. Dillin,
485 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (rejecting both deliberate indifference and
gross negligence standards and adopting a standard based on specific language in
Leite); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1978) (plaintiff
must prove deliberate indifference by municipality).
7 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
8 Id. at 1204.
9 Id. at 1200. The police initially stopped Harris for speeding. Appendix to
Petition for Certiorari at 2a, City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (No.
86-1088) [hereinafter Appendix]. When Harris became "uncontrollably upset and
uncooperative," the officer arrested her. Id.
10 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1200.
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herently." Although Harris twice slumped to the floor after being taken inside the station,' 2 the officers ultimately released her
without summoning medical care. 1 3 Immediately after her release from custody, Harris was taken to a hospital, where physicians found her to be emotionally ill.' 4
Harris later filed suit against the city and its public officials in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, alleging numerous state law and federal constitutional violations.' 5 One claim, lodged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that Harris' right to receive necessary medical care while in
police custody had been violated by the city because it had failed
to adequately train its employees.' 6 The trial court found that a
Canton regulation designated shift commanders to be solely responsible for determining whether detainees required medical
attention and for summoning such attention when necessary.7
"I Id. The shift commander, whose presence was requested by the arresting officers, asked Harris if she needed medical attention. Appendix, supra note 9, at 2a.
12 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1200. After falling a second time, the officers left Harris
lying on the floor so that she would not fall again. Id. At trial, the city maintained
that "she chose to slump each time and was fully conscious and aware of her actions." Appendix, supra note 9, at 2a.
13 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1200. Harris was held for approximately one hour. Id.
14 Id. at 1200-01. Harris was taken directly to the hospital in an ambulance summoned by her family. Id. at 1200. "She was diagnosed as suffering from gross
stress reaction, anxiety and depression, with symptoms including immobility and
respiratory difficulty." Appendix, supra note 9, at 2a. Harris was kept in the hospital for one week. Harris, 109 S.Ct. at 1201. She subsequently received outpatient
treatment for approximately one year. Id.
15 Id. The constitutional claims included "unlawful seizure, cruel and unusual
punishment, deprivation of liberty and physical well-being without due process,
failure to provide equal protection of the law due to race, and unlawful search."
Appendix, supra note 9, at 2a. The state law claims were "false imprisonment, assault and battery." Id.
16 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1201. The fourteenth amendment due process clause
requires a government entity to furnish medical care to individuals who have been
injured during apprehension by the police. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The standard of fault required to impose liability
for a violation of this right has not yet been determined by the Court. See id. at 244.
In pertinent part, the fourteenth amendment prohibits any state from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1201 & n.2. The regulation provided that a policeman
designated to act as "jailer" of the station
shall, when a prisoner is found to be unconscious or semi-unconscious, or when he or she is unable to explain his or her condition, or
who complains of being ill, have such person taken to a hospital for
medical treatment, with permission of his supervisor before admitting
the person to City Jail.
Id. at 1201 n.2 (citation omitted).
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Evidence also indicated that these shift commanders were not
specially trained for making such determinations.' 8
The jury found for Harris solely on the claim for failure to
provide adequate medical care.' 9 The district court subsequently
rejected the city's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdictA0 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 2 ' The United States
Supreme Court granted the city's petition for certiorari 22 and vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision, remanding the case for a new
trial. 23 The Court held that a municipality may be found liable
under § 1983 for failure to train its police force only where such
failure amounts to "deliberate indifference" to the constitutional
rights of persons who come into contact with the police.24
Section 1983 evolved from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 187 1,25 an act passed in reaction to the rampant violence oc18 Id. at 1201. The record suggested, however, that the officers did have first aid
training. Id. at 1205 n.11.
19 Id. at 1201. The jury found against the city and awarded Harris $200,000 in
damages. Appendix, supra note 9, at 4a.
20 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1201. The district court found that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the city vested total discretion in the police supervisor
with regard to decisions on medical treatment. Id. The court further maintained
that the jury could reasonably find that the granting of such authority, without adequate medical training, was "grossly negligent or so reckless that future police misconduct was almost inevitable or substantially certain to result." Id. (quoting
Appendix, supra note 9, at 16a).
21 Harris v. Cmich, 798 F.2d 1414 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). In an unpublished opinion, the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court's analysis, declaring that a municipality
that acts "recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence" in failing to train its
police force can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1201
(quoting Appendix, supra note 9, at 5a). The court of appeals stated that the failure
to train must be so reckless that the violation of an individual's constitutional rights
was "substantially certain to result." Id. (quoting Appendix, supra note 9, at 5a). In
arriving at this decision, the court relied upon two of its prior decisions concerning
§ 1983 municipal liability. Id. at 1201 n.3. (citing Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198 (6th
Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Shepherdsville v. Rhymer, 473 U.S. 901,
reinstated, 775 F.2d 756, 757 (6th Cir. 1985); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d
869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Despite its agreement with the district court's analysis, the court of appeals
found that segments of the jury instructions erroneously indicated that liability
might attach under "a mere respondeat superior theory." Id. at 1201. Because the
jury did not state the exact basis for its finding, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a
new trial was necessary. Id.
22 City of Canton v. Harris, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988).
23 Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1207.
24 Id. at 1204.
25 Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
The Act was also referred to as the Ku Klux Act, since Congress had the Klan
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curring in the reconstruction south.26 In enacting § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act, Congress sought to give citizens a means of enforcing
their federal rights against local government. 27 Traditional notions of federalism, however, proved hard to displace and the
United States Supreme Court ultimately narrowed the scope of
§ 1983's protection. 28 As a result, § 1983 remained dormant for
many decades following its passage.29
"particularly in mind." See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 174 (1961) (quoting
RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 857 (1937)).
26 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-76, 178. The need for federal legislation arose
because state and local officials were "unable or unwilling to enforce... state law"
against the perpetrators of this violence. Id. at 176 (emphasis in original). The
Court also noted that "of the hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people
through the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one [was] punished." Id. at
178 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Pratt)). The Act of 1871 was prompted by a March 21, 1871 letter from President
Grant requesting congressional action. Id. at 172-73 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., I st Sess. 244 (1871)). For a discussion of the events leading up to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, see Developments in the Law--§ 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1137-56 (1977).
27 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. The Court in Monroe noted:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies.
Id. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights ....
). The Act was enacted under Congress'
power, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, to enforce that amendment.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. See also Brown, Municipal Liability Under § 1983 and the
Ambiguities of BurgerCourt Federalism,27 B.C.L. REV. 883, 885 (1986) (indicating that,
under § 1983, the federal government necessarily forces state agencies "to take
action that [they] would not otherwise have taken").
28 The Court restricted the scope of § 1983 by narrowly interpreting the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. It construed this
amendment to contain few federally protected rights. See, e.g., Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) (declining to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment due process clause). Furthermore, the Court established that actions not
sanctioned by state law were not state action. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York,
193 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1904). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 115667 (discussing the Court's and the nation's attitudes toward civil rights and federalism after the Civil War).
29 See Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 After
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q 151, 155 & n.20 (1986) (indicating that only 21 cases were brought under § 1983 between the time of its enactment and 1920).
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In 1961, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape3 0 gave new life
to § 1983. The plaintiffs in Monroe alleged that thirteen members
of the Chicago police force broke into and ransacked their home
without probable cause or a search warrant. 3 ' The plaintiffs also
alleged that the officers verbally and physically abused them, and
unlawfully detained them.32 Claiming a deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law, the plaintiffs sought damages under § 1983 from both the officers and the
City of Chicago.13 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, reversed the dismissal of the action against the officers, 34 declaring
that officers could be held liable under § 1983 for their unauthorized actions.35 The Court upheld the dismissal of the action
against the City of Chicago, however, finding that municipalities
36
were not intended to be amenable to § 1983 claims.
In arriving at the latter conclusion, the majority focused on
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, in particular, the
fate of an amendment proposed by Senator Sherman.37 The
30 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1169 (Monroe
"resurrected section 1983 from ninety years of obscurity").
31 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
32 Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the police forced them to stand naked in the
room during the search. See id. The complaint further claimed that the police prevented Monroe from making a phone call at the police station and kept him there
for 10 hours without levying a specific charge. Id.
33 Id. at 169-70.
34 Id. at 192.
35 Id. at 183-87. The Court relied on two cases that interpreted the "under
color of" state law clause of 18 U.S.C. 242 to include unauthorized actions by government employees. Id. (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
36 Id. at 191-92.
37 Id. at 188-92. The Sherman Amendment provided:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary
shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned,
or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any
persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such
offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred
upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the
inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to
the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to his
widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be
recovered by such person or his representative by a suit in any court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which
the offense was committed, to be in the name of the person injured,
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Sherman Amendment permitted any individual victimized by certain violent acts to institute a suit against the "county, city, or
parish" where the incident occurred.
The Amendment would
have allowed such suits without regard to who committed the violence. 9 Justice Douglas interpreted the overwhelming rejection of this Amendment as congressional opposition toward
exposing municipalities to civil liability.40 Thus, the Court determined that Congress did not intend to include municipalities
within the meaning of the word "person" as found in § 1983.41
The Monroe decision was criticized because it fell short of
providing an effective remedy against unauthorized civil rights violations.4 2 In addition, judicial efforts were made to circumvent
the municipal immunity holding.4 3 After seventeen years, the
or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish.
And execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit and
may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any person in
said county, city, or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may
recover the full amount of such judgment, costs and interest, from
any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot
in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. In arriving at this interpretation, the Court emphasized that the provision eventually substituted for the Sherman Amendment, now
42 U.S.C. § 1986, eliminated any imposition of municipal liability. Id. at 189-90.
The Court also stressed Senator Sherman's statements that agreement was not possible without such a change. Id. at 190. Further, the Court relied upon the debate
over the Amendment, which focused upon Congress' power to impose "any obligation" upon municipalities. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804
(1871) (statement of Mr. Poland)).
41 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. The Court noted the plaintiff's reliance upon a recently passed Act, which provided "[t]hat in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word
.person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the
context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense."
Id. at 190-91 (citation omitted). The majority contended, however, that this definition was "merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." Id. at 191.
42 Levin, supra note 2, at 1519-31, 1540-44 (rejecting Monroe's legislative history
interpretation, and criticizing municipal immunity doctrine on public policy
grounds); Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 131, 132-36 (1972). The Court's finding of various
official immunities further diluted the protections of Monroe. See Levin, supra note
2.
43 Some courts found that Monroe should not bar § 1983 actions where municipalities were not immune under state law. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358,
368-70 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973). This approach was rejected by the Court, however. See Moor
v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). Other courts determined that the municipal immunity of Monroe did not apply to equitable actions. See, e.g., Garren v.
City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th Cir. 1971). This was also rejected
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Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services finally eliminated the
municipal immunity doctrine."
The Monell Court expressly overruled that portion of the
Monroe4 5 decision which held that municipalities were not "per46
sons" under the purview of § 1983 and were not subject to suit.
In Monell, the Court evaluated a regulation that required pregnant employees to take uncompensated leaves of absence upon
their fifth month of pregnancy, regardless of medical necessity.4 7
Jane Monell and several colleagues filed a class action seeking
back pay and an injunction against further enforcement of the
regulation.4 8 The complaint named the New York City Board of
by the Supreme Court. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). However, by remanding Kenosha to resolve jurisdictional questions regarding the defendant state attorney general, the Supreme Court implied that the plaintiffs could
gain equitable relief by suing the attorney general in his official capacity. This approach was adopted by the lower courts, and ultimately recognized by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976). Some courts extended this official capacity loophole by
ordering defendant officials to pay plaintiffs with municipal money. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men of Allen
County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 287 (6th Cir. 1974).
An additional means of evading municipal immunity developed from the
Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Implicitly recognizing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a), the Bivens Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to monetary relief
from a claim directly under the United States Constitution. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at
397. In Kenosha, the Court suggested that this type of claim also applied to municipal defendants through its second reason for remand, to determine if the amount in
controversy with the city was sufficient to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). See Kenosha,
412 U.S. at 514. Although the Bivens type action was practically identical to the
§ 1983 action dismissed in Monroe, namely a damage suit against a local government for a constitutional deprivation, many lower courts permitted it. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. City of West Haven
v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), rev'd, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1016 (1980); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th
Cir. 1975). Other courts, however, refused to apply Bivens to municipalities. See, e.g.,
Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Perry v. Linke, 394 F.
Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp.
1366, 1377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See generally Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services: A Supreme Court Adoption of Lower Court Exceptions, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 251 (1979)
(discussing the policy arguments advanced by lower federal courts to circumvent
the municipal immunity doctrine).
44 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
45 Id. at 663.
46 Id. at 690. While Monell involved a city, the holding applied to all local government units. See id.
47 Id. at 660-61 & n.2.
48 Id. at 660-61. Before trial, defendants amended their policy to one requiring
leaves of absence only upon medical necessity. Id. at 661 & n.2. Thus, the district
court rendered plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief moot. Id. at 661 (citing Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
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Education, the Department of Social Services, the City of New
York, and the head of each entity as defendants.4 9
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the majority began its
analysis by reviewing the legislative history of § 1983.50 The
Court discarded the Monroe Court's finding that the Sherman
Amendment was rejected because it allowed civil liability against
municipalities. 5 ' Rather, the Monell majority determined that the
Sherman Amendment was opposed because it effectively placed
an affirmative duty upon municipalities to protect their citizens.52
The Court suggested that Congress did not believe that it had
the constitutional power to compel municipalities to provide
such protection. 53 Additionally, the Court posited that the meaning of "persons" under § 1983 encompassed municipalities.5 4 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Monell Court was influenced by
the legislative intent that § 1983 be liberally construed,5 5 by the
judicially established view that the term "persons" included municipal corporations, 5 6 and by an act of Congress passed immedi57
ately before the Civil Rights Act that codified this judicial view.
aft'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The trial court also
denied backpay, relying upon Monroe. Id. at 662.
49 Id. at 661.
50 Id. at 664-89.
51 Id. at 664-83.
52 Id. The Court concluded that "[a] fresh analysis of the debate on the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 ... shows.., that Monroe incorrectly equated the 'obligation' of
which Representative Poland spoke with 'civil liability.' " Id. at 665. Contra supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
53 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-79. The Court noted the doubts expressed by Representative Blair regarding the constitutionality of placing an affirmative duty upon
municipalities. Id. at 673-76 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795
(1871) (statement of Rep. Blair)). The majority further noted that many opponents
of the Sherman Amendment, including Poland upon whom the Monroe Court relied, shared Blair's views. Id. at 676 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
Justice Brennan declared that these views were supported by the prevailing doctrine of coordinate sovereignty. Id. According to this doctrine,
the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to
perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload the officer
with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the State, and might impose on him duties
of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was
elevated by the State.
Id. at 678 (quoting Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107-08
(1860)).
54 Id. at 683-89.
55 Id. at 684-86.
56 Id. at 687-88 (citing Louisville R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558
(1844); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121 (1869)).
57 Id. at 688-89 (citation omitted). But see Monell, 436 U.S. at 719-20 (Rehnquist,
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The Court determined, however, that Congress did not intend to permit municipal liability based upon a mere respondeat
superior theory.58 The majority emphasized that nothing in the
statute affirmatively suggested, or could be construed to create,
this type of vicarious liability.59 Noting several conceptual similarities between respondeat superior and the Sherman Amendment,
the Court deduced congressional opposition to respondeatsuperior
from the rejection of the Amendment. 60 The Court declared that
a municipality could be held liable only for deprivations that resulted from an official policy or a governmental custom. 6 ' Because the municipal policy in Monell was clearly the "moving
force" behind the deprivations, the Court entered judgment for
the plaintiffs.62
In cases like Monell, where there was a written or acknowledged municipal regulation, the policy or custom framework was
easily applied.63 The test proved more problematic, however,
where plaintiffs alleged unofficial policies, especially those of municipal inaction. 64 Courts, however, basically accepted that muJ., dissenting) (maintaining that Congress intended for a more limited definition of
"person").
58 Id. at 691-95.
59 Id at 692 n.57.
60 Id. at 692 n.57, 693-94. The Court expressed three connections. Id. at 69194. First, the Court noted that the Sherman Amendment, like respondeat superior,
imposed vicarious liability. Id. at 692 n.57. Second, the Court maintained that imposing respondeat superior would have caused the same constitutional problems in
Congress as the Sherman Amendment's imposition of an affirmative police duty.
Id. at 693. Finally, the Court suggested that the reasons behind the Sherman
Amendment were identical to the accepted justifications of respondeat superior,
namely, the desire to reduce the number of accidents, and the desire to pass on the
costs of such accidents to the public. Id. at 693-94.
61 Id. at 690-91. The Court declared:
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983
for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover ... local governments ... may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant
to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
Id. at 691-92. (footnote omitted). For criticism of the Monell Court's rejection of
respondeat superiorand the policy or custom test see Brown, supra note 27, at 892-98.
62 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
63 See supra notes 47, 61-62 and accompanying text.
64 See Brown, supra note 27, at 884. ("it is not an exaggeration to say that no one
knows what 'official policy' is"). Cf. Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected".- The Role
of Causation in § 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1202-28
(1988) (showing three different judicial approaches to municipal liability questions); Annotation, What Constitutes Policy or Custom for Purposes of DeterminingLiability
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nicipal omissions could constitute a policy. 65 Accordingly, the
frequent allegations of inadequate police training policies were
generally recognized.6 6 Without clear guidance from the
Supreme Court on how to apply the custom or policy test to inadequate training claims, however, lower federal courts devised a
variety of different standards.6 7
To give meaning to the Monell policy requirement in the context of these claims, most courts focused on the level of culpability displayed by city policymakers.6 8 The United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, in Leite v. City of Providence, was one of the first courts to utilize such an analysis.70
Leite involved the alleged verbal and physical abuse of an individual by five Providence policemen. 7 ' The plaintiff asserted a
§ 1983 claim that the city had negligently trained and supervised
its officers. 7 2 The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, maintaining that claims of municipal inadequacies under
73
§ 1983 required a higher degree of culpability.
The court specifically declared that, in order for liability to
of Local Government Units Under 42 U.S.C.S. Section 1983-Modern Cases, 81 A.L.R.
FED.
65

549 (1987).

See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1016 (1980). The Turpin court relied on two Supreme Court cases. Id. at 200-01
(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
In the context of deciding when a municipal supervisor may be held liable under
§ 1983, the Rizzo Court required an " 'affirmative link between the occurrence of
the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by
petitioners-expressor otherwise-showing their authorizationor approvalof such misconduct."
Id. at 201 (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371) (emphasis added in Turpin).
66 See supra note 5. Under which theory, policy or custom, often remained unclear. Cf Comment, Liability of a Municipality for Acts Committed by its Police Officers:
Inadequate TrainingDemands Strict Custom or Policy Test, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 525, 535-40
(1984) (distinguishing custom from policy).
67 See, e.g., supra note 6 (cases). See generally Annotation, Liability of Supervisory
Officials and Governmental Entitiesfor Having Failedto Adequately Train, Supervise, or Control Individual Peace Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983,
70 A.L.R. FED. 17 (1984) (reviewing supervisory official and governmental entity
liability under § 1983).
68 See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 & n.7 (1989) (indicating
that lower courts only differ on the degree of fault required).
69 463 F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978).
70 See id.
71 Id. at 587.
72 Id. at 588. The plaintiff also asserted a Bivens claim directly under the United
States Constitution. Id. at 587; see supra note 43. The court rejected this theory of
relief in light of the Monell Court's abolition of municipal immunity. See Leite, 463 F.
Supp. at 587-88 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 713 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
73 Leite, 463 F. Supp. at 591.
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attach to a municipality, the city's policymakers must have either
personally participated in the alleged deprivation or exhibited
"deliberate indifference" toward its likelihood.7 ' The court indicated that deliberate indifference, or tacit authorization, is exhibited if a city's inactions make future deprivations "almost

inevitable."' 75 The Leite court further stated that a city's unwillingness to take remedial steps, despite knowledge of a pattern of
misconduct, would also show such indifference. 76 The court,
however, clarified that such a pattern was not a prerequisite to
municipal liability.7 7 In support of this determination, the court
posited that "the city's citizens do not have to endure a 'pattern'
of past police misconduct" before they will be able to hold the
city accountable.78
Three years later, however, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Parrattv. Taylor 7 9 indicated that any such fo-

cus on culpability did not accord with § 1983.80 In its analysis of
a municipality's alleged negligent deprivation of property,8 ' the
ParrattCourt ruled that § 1983 imposed no independent requirement on the defendant's state of mind.8 2 In arriving at this determination, the Court noted that § 1983 contains no statutory
language prescribing a necessary mental state.83 Additionally,
74 Id. at 590. (relying upon Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)). The Leite court declared that the deliberate indifference standard is in accord with other courts' standards of wantonness, recklessness,
and gross negligence, and used these terms interchangeably. Id. at 590-91. See also
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 670 (3d Cir. 1988) (suggesting
that there is no meaningful difference between deliberate indifference and gross
negligence). But see Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 200-01 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting
a gross negligence standard); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d
134, 143 (2d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing deliberate indifference from gross
negligence).
75 Leite, 463 F. Supp. at 590.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
80 See id. at 534-35.
81 See id. at 529. The plaintiff, a prisoner, ordered hobby materials worth approximately $23.50 through the mail. Id. When the materials were signed for, but
then lost by prison employees, the plaintiff sued under § 1983. Id. at 529-30.
82 Id. at 535. Previous § 1983 cases before the Supreme Court which had focused on the defendant's state of mind had only done so in the context of analyzing
the underlying deprivation. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (a violation of the eighth amendment requires a showing of defendant's deliberate
indifference).
83 See Parralt,451 U.S. at 534. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40
(1979)).
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the majority distinguished § 1983 from its "criminal counterpart," 18 U.S.C. § 242, which imposes criminal sanctions only for
"willful[]" acts causing constitutional deprivations.8 4
Despite the Parrattdecision, lower federal courts continued
to focus on culpability in § 1983 failure to train actions. 85 In addition to courts following the Leite standard, other courts emphasized the showing of a pattern of past misconduct before finding
municipal liability for failure to train.8 6 One such case was
Languirandv. Hayden.8 7
Rendered partially paralyzed from the chest down by a policeman's bullet, the plaintiff in Languirand filed suit against the
municipality for failure to train its officers. 88 The plaintiff submitted evidence that the offending officer had received no formal
training for using a firearm. 89 Finding for the municipality, the
court set forth a fault standard similar to the standard enunciated
by the Leite court. 0 To satisfy this standard, however, the
Languirand court required evidence of "at least a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by intentional or negligent police misconduct and/or" evidence of
84 Id. at 534-35 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1969)). The Court determined that
§ 1983 required two essential inquiries: "(1) whether the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this
conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. at 535. The Court also concluded that a
negligent deprivation of property, which the plaintiff had alleged, was a deprivation
under the fourteenth amendment, but the amendment was not violated because the
plaintiff could receive due process under state tort law. Id. at 536-37, 543. The
Supreme Court subsequently overruled Parrattin part, holding that negligent deprivations were not deprivations under the fourteenth amendment. See Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Daniels Court, however, affirmed the finding
that § 1983 imposed no state of mind requirement. Id. at 329-30.
85 See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1986) (municipality must be deliberately indifferent); Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 200-01 (6th
Cir. 1985) (municipality must be grossly negligent); Languirand v. Hayden, 717
F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir.) (municipality must be "conscious[ly] indifferent") reh' denied, 721 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1983)
86 See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986); Patzner v.
Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th
Cir. 1983); Languirand, 717 F.2d at 220.
87 717 F.2d at 220.
88 Id. at 222. The plaintiff also sued the officer, who was found not liable, presumably by virtue of the good faith in his effort to stop a suspected felon. Id. at 222.
The policeman hit the plaintiff in the neck while attempting to shoot the tires of the
plaintiff's car. Id. at 221-22.
89 Id. at 228. Evidence indicated that the officer was excused from the eight
week police training program. Id.
90 Id. at 227. The Languirand court required a showing of "gross negligence
amounting to conscious indifference." Id.
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general inadequacy in the force.9 ' The court maintained that
properly reflected the policy or custom
such a rule
92
requirement.
In contrast to this standard, other federal courts established
a lower evidentiary standard. These courts allowed the finding of
municipal policy solely from a "single brutal incident. '93 The
United States Supreme Court in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle94 rejected
such an approach. 95 Seven members of a fragmented Court
agreed that such an inference violated Monell because it permitted municipal96 liability without evidence of action by a municipal
policymaker.

The Tuttle plurality also discussed the general validity of
claims which assert inadequate training policies.97 Writing for
the plurality, Justice Rehnquist distinguished such alleged policies from Monell-type policies which are unconstitutional in and
of themselves.98 The Tuttle plurality maintained that these
facially unconstitutional policies only required a statement of the
policy and a single application in order to establish municipal liability.99 On the other hand, because alleged policies of inade91 Id. at 227-28. While the court tied these two requirements with an ambiguous
"and/or," earlier in the opinion, it cited with approval another court requiring "an
essentially systemic failure resulting in a pattern of police misconduct." Id. at 226
(citing Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981). The case has thus been
interpreted as one demanding both general inadequacy and a pattern of abuses.
See, e.g. Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 After
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q 151, 166 (1986); Comment, supra
note 66, at 533. Other courts unambiguously have made proof of a pattern a necessary condition for municipal liability. See, e.g., Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932,
938 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff "failed to establish a pattern of excessive use of force
which would establish" failure to supervise or train claim).
92 Languirand, 717 F.2d at 227.
93 Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980
(1979). The Owens court, however, did consider evidence aside from the single incident. See id. at 1246. See also Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985)
(accepting the Owens "single brutal incident" basis for liability).
94 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (plurality opinion).
95 Id. at 821; id. at 833 (Brennan, J., concurring). Specifically, the seven justices
found error with the trial court's instruction, which permitted the jury to infer a
policy of inadequate training from a "single, unusually excessive use of force." See
id. at 821 (citation omitted); id. at 826, 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 821; id. at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court concluded that
the plaintiff's separate evidence of inadequate training was inconsequential. See id.
at 821-22; id. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring). Because of the general verdict, the
Court could not determine whether the jury relied on the inference or the separate
evidence. See id. at 822.
97 Id. at 822-24.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 822-23. In addition, a single violation committed by a municipal poli-
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quate training are "far more nebulous" and further removed
from the deprivations, they required proof of both municipal
fault and a causal link to the violation. 00 The plurality additionally maintained that this culpability would only be established
upon evidence that "the policymakers deliberately chose a program that would prove inadequate."''
While rejecting the "metaphysical" distinction between
facially unconstitutional policies and policies that simply cause
deprivations, 10 2 Justice Brennan's concurrence also gave some
indication of a culpability requirement. 0 3 The concurrence suggested that some municipal "fault" must be demonstrated in order to satisfy Monell.' 04 In addition, by stating that a § 1983 claim
is available to victims of policies that "foreseeably and avoidably"
cause deprivations, Justice Brennan indicated a need for proof of
cymaker, regardless of the existence of a facially unconstitutional policy, will incur
municipal liability. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (order by county prosecutor causing a deprivation is municipal policy
since prosecutor was a policymaker).
100 Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plurality opinion). In
arriving at this separate requirement of fault, the plurality maintained that Monell
had developed a "fault-based analysis" for municipal liability inquiries. Id. at 818.
Justice Rehnquist also stressed a need to limit the findings of policy, stating: "Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation some municipal
'policy' can be identified behind almost any such harm inflicted by a municipal official; for example, [the policeman] would never have killed Tuttle if Oklahoma City
did not have a 'policy' of establishing a police force." Id. at 823.
In a footnote, the plurality explicitly reserved opinion on "whether a policy
that itself is not unconstitutional, such as the general 'inadequate training' alleged
here, can ever meet the 'policy' requirement of Monell." Id. at 824 n.7.
101 Id. at 823. Justice Rehnquist contended that, without evidence of deliberateness, the finding of municipal liability would strain the Monell policy test, since the
word "policy" suggests a conscious choice. Id. at 823 & n.6 (citing WEBSTER'S
NINTh NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (1983)).

With regard to the causation re-

quirement, Justice Rehnquist required "[a]t the very least . . . an affirmative link"
between the alleged deprivation and policy. Id. at 823.
The fault element in Tuttle was adopted subsequently by the dissent in City of
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Incorporating this element into the causation language of § 1983, Justice O'Connor
declared that "[t]he 'causation' requirement of § 1983 is a matter of statutory interpretation rather than common tort law." Id. She contended that a deliberate indifference requirement was necessary because of the "remote" causal connection
between inadequate training and actual police misconduct. Id. Drawing upon tort
principles for analogy, she asserted that legal causation is generally extended further when an act is done intentionally. Id. at 269 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501 comment a (1965)).
102 Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 833 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 831, 832 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 824 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104 Id. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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municipal negligence.' 0 5 On the other hand, the concurrence indicated that proof of a policy and proof of a causal link were the
only sub-elements of the § 1983 causation requirement.' 6 Justice Brennan thereby suggested that there should not be a separate state of mind inquiry. 10 7 The concurrence thus implied that
mere proof of a policy would satisfy its notion of municipal
fault. 108

Since 1978, when the Monell Court pledged to refine the policy or custom standard on another day, 10 9 the question has
proven deeply divisive for the Court. 10 Without clear guidance,
lower federal courts, in apparent violation of Parratt, have analyzed alleged inadequate training policies in terms of culpability. "' These courts have also developed uneven fault, causation,
and evidentiary standards. 1 2 With this perspective, the Supreme
13
Court delivered its opinion in City of Canton v. Harris. 3
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White first addressed
the city's contention that a municipality could only be held liable
when its policy was facially unconstitutional. 1 4 The majority
Id. at 832 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See id. The fault, or state of mind, element has generally been read into the
causation language in § 1983 because there is no state of mind language in the
statute. See supra note 1.
108 See id. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan explained:
"[W]ithout some evidence of municipal policy or custom . . . there is no way of
knowing whether the city is at fault." Id.
109 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
110 See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988); City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808 (1985). Perhaps the greatest chasm lied between the bulk of the Court and
Justice Stevens, who had maintained that § 1983 should allow respondeatsuperior liability. See, e.g., Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 834-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 See supra notes 68-78, 85-92, and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 6, 68-78, 85-93 and accompanying text. While courts have
focused on culpability in failure to train cases, causation has often been assumed.
See Kritchevsky, supra note 64, at 1223, 1265. Still, some courts have indicated that
an "affirmative link" between the policy and the deprivation is necessary. See, e.g.,
Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (citing Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976). Other courts, however, have expressed that the policy must be
the "moving force" behind the violation. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga.,
774 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1985) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326
(1981); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978)).
113 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). The Court proceeded to the issues only after first
rejecting Harris' contention that certiorari had been improvidently granted because
of the city's failure to preserve the issues it was arguing. Id. at 1202-03. In so ruling, the majority emphasized that Harris' brief in opposition to certiorari had not
raised this objection. Id.
114 Id. at 1203-04. The city suggested that the Court adopt such a rule in light of
the difficulty the Court has had in developing guidelines for municipal liability
105
106
107
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noted that application of this rule to the Harris case would mandate judgment in favor of the city because the municipality's
stated policy of providing medical care to detainees was clearly
not constitutionally infirm.11 5 Relying on its subsequent analysis
supporting failure-to-train liability, the Court rejected such a restrictive interpretation of § 1983.116
While the district court and the court of appeals also recognized failure-to-train grounds, the majority stated that neither
court accurately indicated the proper fault standard for municipal liability.' 17 Noting the unanimous agreement among the circuit courts in allowing municipal liability for inadequate
training," 8 Justice White observed the split in the lower courts
between the use of a gross negligence standard and the use of a
deliberate indifference standard.'
Resolving this conflict, the
majority held that liability may attach to a municipality for inadequate training policies only when the municipality is deliberately
indifferent to the rights of individuals with whom the officers
come into contact. 2 0 The majority reasoned that only when muunder § 1983. Id. at 1203. The Court acknowledged that it had been "deeply divided" in municipal liability cases. Id. at 1203 & n.4. The Court also noted that it
had reserved opinion on the issue of whether only facially unconstitutional policies
were actionable under § 1983. Id. at 1203 (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
108 S. Ct. 915, 936 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.7 (1985) (plurality opinion)).
115 Id. at 1203. The Court examined the Canton regulation which designated the
shift commander solely responsible for medical determinations. Id. The majority
concluded that "[i]t is difficult to see what constitutional guarantees are violated by
such a policy." Id. The Court noted that Harris had conceded the constitutionality
of the regulation itself. Id. at 1203-04.
116 Id. at 1204.
117 Id. The Court declared that the judge's jury instruction on failure to train
liability was improper. Id. Justice White additionally maintained that the Sixth Circuit had provided "an overly broad rule" for inadequate training liability. Id.
118 Id. The majority posited that the only two circuits that had not expressly
adopted failure to train liability had implicitly accepted it. Id. 1204 n.6. (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1988); Lenard v.
Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1983)). Justice White also noted that six
present members of the Court, in prior opinions, at least implicitly accepted inadequate training as a ground for liability. Id. (citing City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480
U.S. 257, 268-70 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, and
White, J.); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 829-31 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.)).
119 Id. at 1204 n.7. The Court contended that the deliberate indifference standard was "the more common rule." Id.
120 Id. at 1204. The Court declared that this rule was consistent with the Court's
"moving force" standard. Id. at 1205 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 326 (1981); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). The Court noted that respondent had claimed both a municipal "custom"
and "policy" of inadequate training. Id. at 1203 n.5. The majority, however, ob-
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nicipal inaction rises to the level of deliberate indifference can it
properly be considered a "policy or custom. "121

The Harris Court further defined deliberate indifference, by
declaring that a policy of inaction sufficient to impose liability
22
must arise from a conscious choice among various alternatives.
Justice White acknowledged that the notion that a city might have
a "policy" of inadequately training its employees defied common
sense. 123 The Court asserted, however, that sometimes the need
for additional or different training may be so obvious that delib24
erate indifference by the city policymakers can be inferred.'
Justice White postulated that the arming of officers without training them in the constitutional limitations of the use of deadly
force would be one such case. 125 The existence of a pattern of
another occasion where the need for
deprivations might indicate
26
training was obvious. 1

The majority asserted that, in assessing municipal liability,
courts must make a separate determination about the adequacy
of the training program. 127 The Court then indicated that the
sufficiency of a training program must be judged in relation to
the "usual and recurring situations with which [officers] must
deal."' 28 The existence of an inadequately trained officer, the
Court posited, would not by itself condemn a program; 1 29 nor
served no real distinction between the two claims. Id. Because this alternative "custom" claim was not evaluated by the circuit court below, the Court explicitly
withheld opinion on it. Id. The Court also noted that the "deliberate indifference"
standard applied only to the question of the municipality's liability and not to the
underlying constitutional deprivation alleged. Id. at 1204 n.8.
121 Id. at 1205.
122 Id. The Court stated that " 'municipal liability under § 1983 attaches whereand only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from
among various alternatives' by city policymakers." Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1205 & n.10.
125 Id. Justice White relied on the fact that "city policy makers know to a moral
certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons." Id. at
1205 n.10 (emphasis added).
126 See id.
127 Id. at 1205-06. Justice White indicated that the training adequacy question
should be the threshold inquiry. Id. at 1205. The Court stated that "[t]he issue in a
case like this one ... is whether that training program is adequate; and if it is not,
the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to
represent 'city policy.' " Id.
128 Id. at 1206.
129 Id. (citing City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 268 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821 (1985) (plurality
opinion)).
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would proof that an officer made a mistake.'5 0 The Court suggested that inadequacies and mistakes may stem from other
sources, such as the negligent administering of a program or
human fallibility.' 3' The majority further stated that evidence
that an injury could have been averted through better training
would be insufficient by itself to create municipal liability. 32 The
Court noted that many faultless encounters are subject to such
claims. 133

After discussing these insufficient proofs of training inadequacy, Justice White articulated a final requirement for municipal
liability: the inadequacy of a city's program must be "closely related" to the deprivation.' 3 4 The Harris Court accordingly suggested that lower courts determine whether each violation would
have been avoided if the officer had received adequate training.' 35 Noting that any officer may act rashly in a given circumstance, the Court acknowledged the difficulty in predicting how
an adequately trained officer would behave.' 3 6 Nevertheless, the
majority expressed confidence in the ability of both judge and
3 7

jury to make this finding.1

Reiterating that a plaintiff will usually be able to demonstrate
38
that there was something the municipality could have done,
the Court concluded that any lesser fault and causation standards
would effectively impose respondeat superior liability on local governments. 3 9 Such liability, maintained the Court, would violate
Monel's proscription against such grounds. 4 ° The Court also
expressed its desire to avoid forcing federal courts into "an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training
Id.
See id. With regard to the latter, the Court explained: "[P]lainly, adequately
trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the
training program or the legal basis for holding the city liable." Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'34 Id.
'35 Id.
136 Id. The majority explained that "since matters ofjudgment may be involved,
and since officers who are well trained are not free from error ... [such officers]
might react very much like the untrained officer in similar circumstances." Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (plurality
opinion)). The Court maintained that persons deprived by a municipal officer
could lobby such claims "in virtually every instance." Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
130
131
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programs."' 14 1 Such second-guessing, the Harris Court asserted,
1 42
would implicate critical federalism issues.
In light of its holding, the majority recognized that Harris'
claims were actionable to the extent that she could prove deliberate indifference by the city. 143 Determining that the evidence on
record did not meet the Court's new standard for § 1983 liability,
the majority then considered whether to reverse or to remand
the case.' 4 4 The Court decided against reversal, noting that the
lower courts had only required Harris to meet the lesser standards.' 45 Thus, Justice White vacated the judgment, leaving the
Sixth Circuit to determine whether Harris should be allowed to
prove her case under the "deliberate indifference" standard. 4 6
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's analysis of
municipal liability for failure to train, but dissented from the decision to remand.1 47 Supporting the Court's analysis, Justice
O'Connor declared that the deliberate indifference requirement
was proper in light of Monell's command, federalism concerns,
and policy reasons. 148 Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's position that only when the need for training was obvious
would it be valid grounds for § 1983 liability.' 4 9 Justice
141 Id. The Court contended that federal courts are "ill-suited" for assuming
such a task. Id.
142 Id. (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976)).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1206-07. The majority indicated that, besides the fault standard, respondent had not yet met the articulated causation standard. Id. at 1206.
145 Id. at 1207.
146 Id. Justice Brennan provided a brief concurring opinion, in which he expressly supported the Court's decision to allow the court of appeals to remand the
case. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
147 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Scalia
and Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id.
148 Id. at 1207, 1208, 1210 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
149 Id. at 1207 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arriving
at this conclusion, Justice O'Connor compared the Sherman Amendment with
§ 1983. Id. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice noted that the Sherman Amendment was opposed because it placed liability
on municipalities "even if the municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing
riot or did not have the wherewithal to do anything about it." Id. (quoting Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978) (emphasis in
original)). The concurrence maintained that § 1983, in contrast, was "not a 'federal good government act' for municipalities." Id. The statute merely enforced the
Constitution, creating no additional rights. Id. (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Monell, 436 U.S. at 684-85; CONG. GLOBE,
42nd Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (1871) (statement of Rep. Edmunds)). Therefore, Justice O'Connor maintained "before an omission that is not in itself unconstitutional
can support" municipal liability, there must be proof that city policymakers had
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O'Connor added, however, that such obviousness would arise
only when the available facts give city policymakers actual or constructive notice that a constitutional deprivation was likely to occur.'

50

Without actual or constructive notice, Justice O'Connor

opined, inadequate training liability could result in liability without fault and thus violate Monell."'5
Justice O'Connor next posited that deliberate indifference to
the constitutional rights of individuals could be shown only in
two ways.' 152 One instance, Justice O'Connor suggested, would
be a lack of training in a constitutional duty that is likely to arise
in an employee's performance of his functions. 15 The Justice
contended that training an officer to diagnose emotional illnesses
hardly amounts to a need likely to arise in a police officer's normal duties. 154 The second means of proving deliberate indifference, asserted Justice O'Connor, would be by showing that a city
failed to remedy or create a program, in the face of a pattern of
constitutional violations. 155

Maintaining that Harris had not, and could not, meet the
adopted fault and causation standards, Justice O'Connor advanced that there was no need to remand the case.' 56 The Justice
suggested that the Court should have applied its standard to the
case because Harris already had an incentive and a full opportunity to provide proof of a municipal policy or custom in the
courts below. 157 Justice O'Connor observed that Harris pronotice that the omission was "substantially certain" to cause a constitutional violation. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.

Id. at 1209. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. Justice O'Connor declared that the inadequacy must create "an extremely
high risk that constitutional violations will ensue." Id. Thus, Justice O'Connor accepted the majority's example of failing to train armed officers in the use of deadly
force as a proper circumstance for municipal liability. Id.
154 Id. In support of this conclusion, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had
not yet defined the extent of a police officer's duty to obtain medical care for a
detainee. Id.
155 Id. (citing Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1986);
Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985); Languirand v. Hayden,
717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th
Cir. 1983)). Justice O'Connor maintained that a pattern of misconduct would put a
municipality on notice. Id.
156 Id. at 1210-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1.57 Id. at 1210 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Noting
that respondent from the outset had asserted a municipal custom of failure to provide medical attention, Justice O'Connor asserted that Harris had failed to satisfy
the prevailing Supreme Court standard. Id. at 1209-10 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court had es152
153
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duced no testimony showing past denials of medical assistance to
emotionally ill detainees, nor any facts that would give the city
notice of the need for better training.' 58 Justice O'Connor submitted that "quite simply nothing in this record" supported the
59
inadequate training claim. 1

Justice O'Connor further maintained that allowing a jury to
determine liability in claims based primarily upon a single incident creates the potential for a jury nullification of the Monell
holding. 160 Justice O'Connor warned that movement toward
placing affirmative duties on local governments would not only
violate the legislative intent of § 1983, but would represent poor
public policy. 61 Recognizing that municipal resources are not
limitless, Justice O'Connor suggested that some government
services would
suffer if municipalities were forced to overtrain in
62
other areas. 1

Although the Harris majority's recognition of a mental element in § 1983 effectively overruled Parratt sub silentio, 16 3 this
finding is not without support. The legislative history of § 1983
indicates that Congress, in drafting the statute, was motivated
largely by local government acquiescence to clear and recurring
anti-black violence.164 The mental state of these officials can
tablished custom to mean "practices ... so ... well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144, 168 (1970)).
158 Id. Justice O'Connor noted uncontroverted evidence refuting Harris' claim.
Id. In particular, the Justice observed that the city's Chief of Police between 1971
and 1980 testified that he had received no grievances about the lack of proper medical care for detainees. Id. Justice O'Connor also acknowledged the testimony of
another former Canton officer, who had never encountered a situation in which
medical care was necessary for a detainee's emotional state. Id.
159 Id. Justice O'Connor maintained that "[n]one of the Courts of Appeal that
already apply the standard we adopt today would allow respondent to take her
claim to a jury based on the facts she adduced at trial." Id. at 1210 (citing Fiacco v.
City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 328-32 (2d Cir. 1986); Patzner v. Burkett, 779
F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 229 (5th
Cir. 1983); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1983)).
160
161

Id.

164

See, e.g.,

Id.Justice O'Connor maintained that the authors of the 1871 Civil Rights Act
themselves understood that "the resources of local government are not inexhaustible." Id.
162 Id. Justice O'Connor advanced that the occurrence of a single incident should
not prompt "[t]he grave step of shifting ... resources" of the municipality. Id. The
Justice warned: "If § 1983 and the Constitution require the City of Canton to provide detailed medical and psychological training to its police officers, or to station
paramedics at its jails, other city services will necessarily suffer, including those with
far more direct implications for the protection of constitutional rights." Id.
163 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
CONG. GLOBE,

42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1871) (statement of Rep.
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quite accurately be described as deliberate indifference. It can be
inferred, therefore, that Congress intended only to reach acts
committed with such acquiescence. The determination that Congress opposed the imposition of respondeat superior liability upon
municipalities also lends support to a fault element. Congres' 165
sional opposition to this doctrine of "imputed negligence"
suggests a congressional intent to punish only cases of actual municipal negligence or fault. By establishing the policy or custom
framework in Monell,166 the Court provided an additional foundation for a culpability requirement. This rubric itself suggests a
mental element, because the notion of deliberateness is implicit
in the concept of policy, as the Tuttle Court initially noted. 1 67 Finally, the lower federal courts' almost instinctive adoption of
fault standards, and their unwillingness to depart from these
standards despite the Parrattruling, indicates
a broad consensus
168
that § 1983 commands a showing of fault.
The choice of the deliberate indifference standard, and the
Harris Court's attention to the training adequacy and causation
inquiries, provide substantial guidance for the lower courts. In
addition, the majority also relieves these courts of deciding
whether only facially unconstitutional policies are actionable
under § 1983.169 Had it upheld the city's argument that only
facially unconstitutional regulations were actionable, the Court
would have reverted somewhat to the thinking of the pre-Monroe
federalist era, when state action only included action specifically
authorized by state law. 7 0 Under such a formulation, municipalities would have had little difficulty insulating themselves by devising unquestionably constitutional regulations.
The opinion, however, leaves several important questions
unanswered. One is the applicability of the Court's holding to
the other claims frequently lodged in § 1983 cases, namely: imGarfield) (indicating that southern states partook in a "systematic maladministration" of the laws).
165 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 499 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
166 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 68-78, 85-92 and accompanying text.
169 Some courts have already considered and rejected the Tuttle plurality's suggested restriction of § 1983 municipal liability to facially unconstitutional policies.
See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Renssalaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1986).
170 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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proper hiring, 17 1 failure to supervise, 172 failure to discipline, 173
and failure to develop a necessary procedure. 174 Also left open is
the possibility that these omissions, and indeed the very claim of
inadequate training addressed in Harris, may constitute municipal "customs."'1 7 5 While the Court's holding indicates an unaccommodating attitude toward alleged policies and customs of
omission, these pleading devices may provide lower courts with a
means of escaping the strict requirements of Harris.
The Court's analysis also stops short of conclusively resolving an important, recurring issue: whether the first incident of
misconduct is actionable under § 1983.176 The necessity of a pattern is only broached by the Court in a footnote, which suggests
that a pattern of misconduct is one example of when the need to
train may be "obvious." 177 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor
more squarely confronts the single-incident question. 178 The
Justice expressly limits the finding of deliberate indifference to
two situations: neglect of training in areas in which training 179
is
obviously needed and neglect of existing misconduct patterns.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly defines what is actionable under § 1983. It should be noted, however, that Justice
O'Connor carefully avoids the delicate question of how many
acts constitute a pattern.'8 0
Finally, the majority's analysis proves somewhat unsatisfying
by virtue of its ignoring the obvious policy decision that underlies its holding. The Court attempts to ground its holding in
Congress' rejection of respondeat superior, declaring that anything
less than the standard it has set would create de facto respondeat
superior.18' This position, however, is far from clear. Negligence
and gross negligence represent two gradations of fault between
the strict liability of respondeat superior and the deliberate indiffer171 See, e.g., McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (finding municipality liable for promoting two improperly trained officers).
172 See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1980).
173 See, e.g., Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1246-47 (D.N.J. 1979).
174 See, e.g.,
Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 651 (7th Cir. 1981)
175 See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 n.5 (1989).
176 See supra notes 77-78, 91-92 and accompanying text.
177 City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 n.10 (1989).
178 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
179 See id.
180 See Comment, supra note 66, at 536. See also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 832 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (indicating that preventing recovery on the first incident of misconduct would be undesirable and a "legal
anomaly").
181 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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ence standard.' 1 2 Although a negligence standard might, as the
Court notes, approach strict liability in instances of nonfeasance
such as these, 8 3 a gross negligence standard, which the Court
implicitly rejects, would seem to require at least some degree of
fault. Contrary to the Court's implication, it would not be strict
liability.
Through its overstatement, the Court avoids mention of the
financial concern basis for its decision. This issue, addressed in
Justice O'Connor's opinion, necessarily lies at the root of any
municipal liability question.' 8 4 Acknowledging that decisions
about municipal liability necessitate some fiscal line-drawing, Justice O'Connor suggests that it is undesirable from a policy perspective to force municipalities to guard against every
conceivable mishap.' 1

5

The Justice correctly states that govern-

ment resources are limited, and must be used for many other
services.' 1

6

By virtue of this open analysis, Justice O'Connor

confronts the municipal liability issue in a more satisfactory manner than does the majority.
AndrewJ Schwartz
182 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, at 208-14 (identifying the various standards of fault in tort cases).
18s See supra notes 138-39. But see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, at 385 ("In
all such cases where the duty [to protect others] does exist, the obligation is not an
absolute one to insure the plaintiff's safety, but requires only that the defendant
exercise reasonable care."). The authors conclude that "[t]here is thus no liability
when such care has in fact been used." Id. (footnotes omitted).
184 See City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981) (rejecting imposition of punitive damages on municipalities partly because of financial
concerns).
185 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.

